SMU Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 5

Article 7

January 1998

The County Courthouse No Longer Looms over the Community
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.

Recommended Citation
Geoffrey C. Hazard, The County Courthouse No Longer Looms over the Community, 51 SMU L. REV. 1559
(1998)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol51/iss5/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Speech
THE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

No

LONGER

LOOMS OVER THE COMMUNITY
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.* t
he title of this Article may be mysterious, but only because it is a
metaphor. The subject of my Article is actually professionalism
and professional ethics in the practice of law. My theme is that
our contemporary concepts of professionalism and professional ethics are
based upon an obsolete image of society, one that contrasts with the social context in which the practice of law is now conducted. This obsolete
image is widely shared by senior members of the profession, who may
have actually experienced the old style of practice, and by many younger
ones. Enraptured by this image, we keep harking back to earlier times
for solutions, or at least amelioration of, what we describe as the erosion
of professionalism, particularly "civility." I do not dispute that there has
been change of the relationships referred to by the term civility. However, the important question is the nature of that change. My purpose is
to direct attention to the social condition in which " professionalism"
must now be nurtured. The modern condition is an impersonal, highly
competitive environment.
To this end, I tender another metaphor to describe the present situation, the metaphor of the high rise law office. I suggest that the high rise
law office now dominates the community and that we should ponder the
implications of that fact.
I. THE LOOMING COURTHOUSE
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century there was a building
boom in courthouses. The boom was most evident in the Midwest and
South but manifested itself all over the country. The typical style can be
called neo-baroque and was not limited to courthouses. The capitol
building in Albany, New York, City Hall in Philadelphia, and the Executive Office Building in Washington are other examples of the style. The
* Trustee, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, American Law
Institute.
f Presented at Southern Methodist University School of Law on March 19, 1998, for
the Roy R. Ray Lecture.
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exterior features include height and size relative to the other structures in
the area and a formal design exhibited through columns and stairways,
tall windows, and somber decorative detail. The interior features include
a large atrium, high ceilings, long hallways, marble or terrazzo floors, and
oaken interior walls. Inside the building, the courtrooms are deep and
wide and centered on the bench, which is elevated to a dominating position over the courtroom well. People coming to the courthouse for the
first time are in awe, as they are supposed to be. Even the court regulars-lawyers and staff-have the sense of being in church, indeed perhaps a regional cathedral. Buildings like this are still in use in many
American cities.'
Small counties could not always afford such splendor. However, they
did the best they could. Equally important to the architecture of the
court house was location. If there was a hill or even a slight rise in the
terrain, the courthouse was situated at its apex. If the terrain was flat, the
courthouse was surrounded by a public park and thereby distanced from
nearby commercial buildings. In any event, it was the most prominent
building in town.
Let me paint a picture also of the surrounding professional and commercial community. It consisted of a handful of lawyers and doctors, the
clergy of several denominations, perhaps an accountant (the tax laws
were not yet so devilish as to require every business to have an accountant), the presidents of two or three banks, and a few pharmacists. This
small group of professionals typically constituted all of the locals who had
gone to college except for the teachers in the local schools, who were
mostly women, not allowed to vote until 1920, and hence usually outside
the local political orbit. The commercial sector included businessmen in
various retail and wholesale trades, depending on the regional economy.
(There were very few businesswomen anywhere.) The handful of businessmen who dominated local manufacturing and commerce also dominated the local economy. The rest of the urban population were clerks or
mechanics of one kind or another, whether at the local railroad terminal,
the telegraph office, blacksmith and machinery shops, or in the offices of
the county clerk and the county sheriff. The surrounding rural population
were farmers and farm laborers and the women and children. In parts of
the country having a black population, the blacks usually were town laborers or farm hands except for a few proprietors of enterprises catering
to blacks-funeral director, insurance agent, perhaps a nurse practitioner.
An important element of the social structure was religious affiliation.
Most people believed in God and had at least nominal affiliation with a
specific congregation or parish. There were various denominations and
many separate congregations. Membership in congregations generally
reached across socio-economic status, somewhat strengthening the position of the churches as an integrating force in the community.
1. See PHYLLIS LAMBERT
(Richard Pare, ed. 1978).
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The officials of government included the mayor, the city councilmen
and county commissioners, the state legislative delegation, and the
judge-or two or three judges in larger cities. The judges were the community's highest level full-time government officials. The federal government was far away and rarely in evidence, except through the post office.
State government generally was almost as remote.
This typical community had a distinct socio-economic structure, to refer to it in academic terminology. Economic authority was concentrated
in the local bank presidents and owners of the dominant businesses.
Political authority was concentrated in the mayor and the county commissioners. Legal authority was concentrated in the judge and a handful of
prominent lawyers. Others in the upper literate local community circulated around these concentration points. The rest of the community-the
city clerks and the farm laborers-were politically more or less passive
followers.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY'S
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
This classic American community was self-contained, hierarchical and
regulated by inherited unwritten conventions of conduct. 2 Classic portrayals of this social system in American literature include Hawthorne's
The Scarlet Letter, Dreiser's An American Tragedy, Lewis's Babbitt, and
not least-given its focus on a lawyer-Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird.
The small town being self-contained, most interactions among the local
population were with other members of the community. Transactions
with people in outside communities were occasional and relatively formal-intercity bank transactions, purchase and sale of farm and industrial
supplies and products, tax payments to the state government, mortgage
transactions with East Coast financial centers, and so on. Virtually all
transactions in a self-contained community necessarily involved "repeat
players" or players having direct connections with repeat players. Accordingly, everyone had a reputation based on his or her local record and
on local gossip. Reputations were a basis for estimating the capability
and integrity of the players on both sides. The players were aware that
their performance in every new transaction would be addressed in future
gossip and thereby would add or detract from reputation.
The town being hierarchical, significant decisions in the town's business, political and community affairs were taken through the community's
power structure. Voting at elections was of course democratic. Although
elections are considered crucial in democratic theory, elections in the
traditional community usually reflected local consensus previously established. In any event, elections were only occasional and only determined
incumbency in elective office. The incumbents following the elections
2. See generally ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A
STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE (1929) (MIDDLETOWN is the classic sociological study of a small American town.).
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made decisions about public affairs in closed meetings-the proverbial
"smoke filled room." Most important decisions in other affairs were also
made in closed meetings-marriage and inheritance in the family, business decisions, and most all decisions by non-elective officials in government. So also the decisions of professionals such as lawyers and decisions
based on their advice. So, of course, were judicial decisions.
In closed meetings, decision ordinarily depends not on headcount but
on effective influence-"clout" as they call it in Chicago. In business, as
the saying goes, the boss is not always right but he (or she) is always the
boss. In the family, parents dominated decisions and the family was, or
was widely thought to be, based on a paternalistic principle. As for decisions in government, the point about clout was made best by Abraham
Lincoln. It can be recalled that in a critical decision, upon counting that
his ten cabinet members voted "nay" while he voted "aye," Lincoln said,
"The ayes have it." In the traditional local community, decisions reflected
power and authority derived from family relationships, property ownership, management control of business operations, church affiliation, and
local leverage derived from connections with the outside world. Not least
important was clout expressed in character, particularly the ability to deal
with reality and the steadiness to carry through difficult courses of action.
I have gone on at some length in describing the "informal structure" of
the traditional community. By informal structure I mean the complex
web of relationships through which a community actually functions, as
distinct from its formal legal structure. In this country, government formally proceeds through public debate and voting, business is separated
from government, there is a "wall" between church and state, and everyone is equal. In the informal structure, the boundaries between sectors
are permeable and people have distinct places in the society. Sociologists, legal realists, and serious politicians believe that the informal system ordinarily and substantially determined outcome in most transactions
in the old days and that the informal system continues to determine most
outcomes today. As was observed by Tip O'Neill, former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, "All politics is local politics."
III.

PROFESSIONALISM AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN
THE TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY

The governance of the legal profession in the traditional community
was part and parcel of this system. 3 That is, governance of the legal pro3. See Joel F. Handler, THE LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN
A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY 3 (1967); see also People v. Beige, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975), affd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 62 (1976). This is the famous, or infamous, "Buried Bodies
Case," where a lawyer representing a criminal defendant in a small upstate New York
community withheld information given to him by his client identifying the location of the
bodies of two young women that the defendant had killed. The lawyer disclosed the information only after a plea bargain in which the information was used as a bargaining chip.
The lawyer's conduct, in fulfilling what seems to me his clear duty, resulted in public
outrage.
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fession was also locally self-contained, hierarchical in structure and conducted according to unwritten conventions. Descriptions of this system
were the basis for reforms in the system of professional discipline that
were recommended in 1970 by the "Clark Committee" Report, formally
known as the American Bar Association Special committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in
Disciplinary Enforcement. The following are excerpts for that Report:
The intimacy, the small size and the lack of organization and leadership in many of our small county bars constantly hobble effective
[disciplinary] procedures. Also there is the back scratching phenomenon. For example, some of our bar associations have as few as a
half dozen members. For them to discipline one of their own is virtually an impossible task. .... 4
We have found in many instances that a complaint might be
against an attorney in the rural areas where the attorneys are close,
and it could be a serious embezzlement of funds, and the member of
the disciplinary agency might go to his friend and say, "Look, Joe,
why don't you take care of this before it goes any further. . ...5
A local grievance committee is most reluctant to bring a disbarment proceeding because the defendant is usually known to the
6
members of the local grievance committee on a first name basis.
These accounts leave unstated how a professional community of lawyers that avoided formal disciplinary proceedings managed to cope with
misfeasance and malfeasance occurring within its company. The answer
is, of course, that the lawyers used the informal techniques of social control. These include professional gossip (leading to local bad reputation),
extra wariness in transactions, refusal of referrals, restriction of "professional courtesies," and, in varying degree, ostracism. One form of ostracism imposed on a lawyer would be the difficulty a tainted lawyer would
have in carrying through transactions-settlement of a lawsuit, for example, or bargaining out terms of a business deal-because other lawyers
distrusted him. Another form of ostracism would be the inability of an
outcast to form a partnership with any other local lawyer.
The judge was party to most of the information going into a lawyer's
reputation and used his informal powers as sanctions. A judge could refuse to grant extensions and excuses, could apply the rules of procedure
with rigor instead of liberality, and view with special skepticism papers
authored by the suspect lawyer. Loss of "credit" with the judge could put
a lawyer out of business.
These mechanisms in aggregate could be called social "friction": small
impediments and obstacles, some of them virtually invisible, resulting in
loss of motion and energy and accomplishment of purpose. In more for4. ABA Special Comm. on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and

Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement 9 (1970) (also known as the Clark Commission) (quoting the chairman of a state bar association disciplinary committee).
5. Id. at 10 (quoting a member of a state disciplinary commission).
6. Id. at 16.
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mal terms, in the traditional community the system for enforcing norms
of conduct is based on shared local knowledge, accurate or merely believed, and grant of informal benefits and imposition of informal retaliatory sanctions based on such knowledge. This mechanism, not legal rules,
supplied the effective governance of the legal profession.
Systematic enforcement of formal written rules of ethics was not possible because, as it was said to the Clark Commission, "the defendant is
usually known to the members of the local grievance committee on a
first-name basis."' 7 Nor was systematic enforcement necessary, except
perhaps in extreme cases, because the threat of informally imposed "friction" was a generally adequate deterrent. It is my interpretation that the
extreme cases, those involving disbarment, essentially gave formal legal
ratification to a verdict previously established by informal consensus. It
is also my interpretation that the informal system was the effective fibre
of professionalism in the bygone era.
Perhaps, needless to say, the system was not always fair and impartial,
as noted in the Clark Committee Report. The president of a black bar
association in a jurisdiction with a substantial black lawyer population
testified: "We do not have any representation on the [grievance]
committee." 8
IV. THE HIGH RISE LEGAL PROFESSION
In the world of today and tomorrow the county courthouse no longer
looms above. Instead, prominence and predominance reposes in the lawyers and not the judges. Within the bar, predominance reposes in the law
firms dealing in high stakes transactions and high stakes litigation. No
longer is "the" judge a central figure, nor do the small country bars have
much significance. The modern American population is increasingly concentrated in cities and metropolitan areas, localities which now all have
multiple judges, often dozens of judges, sometimes hundreds. The members of the bar in a typical urban community are no longer on a first
name basis; indeed, they are no longer even on a last name basis. Ask the
average lawyer the name of the president of the county bar association
and you will likely draw a blank. Ask the name of the "powerhouse" law
firms, however, and you can usually get an informed answer.
The powerhouse law firms have local connections and usually include
lawyers whose practice is locally-oriented. 9 However, these firms have
prominence primarily through their out-of-town connections: connections to business corporations with headquarters elsewhere; to financial
centers in New York and, increasingly, in London, Tokyo, and Germany;
to centers of political power in the state capitals and in Washington; and
7. Id.
8. Id. at 44.
9. See JOHN P.

HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 280 (1982) (stating that lawyers from large firms

more connections to local "notables").
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tend to have
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to professional circles across the nation and the world, now organized on
the basis of legal specialties and not local residence. These law firms typically have their offices no longer across from the old courthouse but up in
high rise office buildings. The high rise office building, not the courthouse, now looms over us.
There is nevertheless an informal system of governance working in this
new socio-economic context, just as there was a different kind of informal
system working in the context of yesteryear. The new system like the old
depends on gossip, reputation, and the sanction of "friction," just as in
the old days. Indeed, at the high speed at which the modern professional
community functions, avoidance of friction becomes an even more important element in accomplishing transactions. As a matter of elementary
physics, obstruction in turning the wheels of an oxcart is much less serious
than obstruction in the wheels of modern commerce. The point can be
made by recognizing that the opposite of "friction" in this context is "access." In today's world of law, business, and politics, "access" is usually
critical. Everyone can get in the front door and talk to the receptionist.
But will the key person inside the door see you, answer your telephone or
fax messages, agree to meet?
In my estimate, neither the legal profession nor the general public nor
the academic community has fully recognized and understood the disappearance, or at least the diminution of the significance, of the old courthouse and the old social community in which the courthouse was a
central institution. The legal profession has of course sensed the gap in
various ways. One response has been increasing elaboration of legal
rules to govern the ethics of the profession. 10 Some elaboration is required in my opinion, for example in the concept of ethical responsibility
of the law firm as distinct from the responsibility of individual lawyers.
Another response is the purposive nurturing of informal social mechanisms that function like the old courthouse community. Here I have in
mind such movements as the American Inns of Court, the recognition of
the importance of mentoring within law firms, and the increasing activities of specialized bar affiliations such as the Business Law and Litigation
Sections of the American Bar Association. However, some of the bar's
activity represents a quest for return to the good old days. In my opinion,
that quest will be as futile as the hope that we could solve problems of
urban congestion by requiring attendance at more cowboy movies.
The general public has not caught on, largely because its has had little
assistance in understanding the new situation. The average citizen evidently thinks of lawyers, for good and evil but unfortunately mostly for
evil, in terms of personal relations in an intimate community. However,
average citizens recognize that most of them do not know the name of a
reliable lawyer. Indeed, most of them recognize that they do not even
10. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final
Draft 1996) (formulating common law governing lawyers); ABA Special Comm'n on Ethics 2000 (1983) (considering revisions in Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by ABA).
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know someone who in turn would know the name of a reliable lawyer. In
the community around the old courthouse, the average citizen usually
would have had at least that second hand acquaintance with a lawyer.
Now, the average citizen is relegated to lawyer advertising, thereby subject to the peril of being unable to differentiate between conscientious
legal assistance and unctuous exploitation. Increasingly, to find a reliable
lawyer the average citizen needs the help of what we used to call "lay
intermediaries." That is, they turn for advice about a reliable lawyer to
the modern equivalents of an old-fashioned neighborhood-an employer,
a labor union, a trade association, a religious congregation.
However, the bar generally has been unhelpful in fostering these substitutes for the old neighborhood and indeed has generally been hostile to
them. These organized connections between ordinary citizen and legal
services are of little interest to the large law firms. Large law firms connect with business clients through different information networks than
those that are available to the average citizen. At the same time, the
small firm and solo practitioners either become specialists whose practice
is based on referrals from other lawyers or general practitioners who retain hope that personal injury and other potentially lucrative cases will
come over the transom. The interest of lawyers in equal fishing rights for
clients, although largely a delusion in my opinion, has been the basis of
opposition to new kinds of "lay intermediaries." That interest should
yield to recognition of the interests of the average citizen.
Finally, in my estimate the academic community has not been of much
help in clarifying the modern condition so far as legal services are concerned. In recent years, systematic study of the social process in legal
services-the sociology of law-has not been a growth industry. There
has been some very good work, but it has concentrated on the lawyerclient interaction rather than on how the client and lawyer initially entered the interaction. Moreover, systematic study has not been adequately addressed to the large firms serving business clients. This
dormancy is somewhat difficult to understand, given the vibrancy of the
sociology of law three decades ago. One reason may be the relative
eclipse of sociology in favor of economics, a field in which the readymade if often superficial answer is freedom of the marketplace. Another
explanation no doubt is the great technical difficulty of studying the subject. Obstacles include the rule of confidentiality of lawyer-client affairs,
the geographical dispersion of the relevant populations, trade secret interests of the bar, and the extraordinary labor and patience required for
good work. Another explanation in my view is the orientation of many
members of the academic community interested in legal sociology. At all
events, really illuminating contemporary studies of connection and interaction between lawyers and clients at the level of the powerhouse law
firms are virtually nonexistent.
Doing systematic studies of a professional community based on national and international networks instead of local community would be
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very difficult. The people involved are by definition dispersed, their interactions intermittent, their communications confidential, the opportunity to be a silent observer very difficult to establish. Austin Sarat and
William Felsteiner have demonstrated what can be done today in an oldfashioned local community, in their study of divorce lawyers. 1 Heinz,
Laumann, Nelson, and Schnorr have done illuminating work in a large
complex urban community, but here again have the advantage of working
in a single locality.' 2 And there are suggestive but unsystematic observations in books such as Lincoln Caplan's study of the law firm of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. 3 Pulling these approaches together into a
systematic study of larger firm practice would be a formidable undertaking. Until such a study is accomplished, assuming that it could be, we will
have to proceed on the basis of anecdotal information and professional
lore.
V. CONCLUSION
A major problem in governance of the contemporary legal profession,
as in many other aspects of contemporary life, is that we have not adjusted our perceptions and frames of references to deal realistically with
the world as it has become. We tend instead to assume that the old informal system is still in place and that it continues silently to reinforce the
legal rules that we long thought were self-executing. That assumption has
proved inadequate as a mechanism for governance of the bar. In default
of better solutions, concerned members of the bar have frantically added
layers of rules; specifications in sub-rules; additional procedures and preliminaries to legal procedures; and provisions for post-procedure review.
In these efforts, we have perhaps not taken adequate account of the structure of the new informal systems, nor asked how they differ from the
traditional forms that occupy our collective mind's eye, nor how the new
mechanisms interact with the legal system.
Our assumption continues to be that the legal rules are self-executing.
However, the new legal rules, like the old ones, are embedded in a social
and political matrix. In the modern context the difference is not so much
the rules but the modern social matrix-complex, high-speed, locally im11. See AUSTIN SARAT &
CLIENTS:

WILLIAM

L.F. FELSTEINER,

DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR

POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 4,8 (1995) (describing divorce

lawyer interactions with clients). See generally CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND
COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994) (describing the interaction of law and

culture in three mainstream American towns).
12. See John P. Heinz et al., The Constituencies of Elite Urban Lawyers, 31 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 441, 446-60 (1997); see also Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun
as Facilitator:Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 679, 687 (1996) (discussing the role of lawyers in the Silicon Valley).

13. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A
LEGAL EMPIRE (1993). See also MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN
THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 25-167 (1994) (discussing the impact of five legal organizations on the lives of their lawyers).
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personal, more dependent than ever on image, connection and reputation. We have not yet caught up with that change.

